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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Parental rights to children may be terminated or transferred if the court
determines that it will substantially serve the welfare of the child.' To terminate or transfer these rights, most jurisdictions required that the petitioner prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts that justified this
drastic action.2 However, in the recent Supreme Court case of Santosky v.
Kramer,3 the Court elevated the standard in termination suits to "clear
and convincing" evidence.
Similarly, the preponderance of the evidence standard has been used to
adjudge whether a child is neglected; such a determination may result in
the temporary suspension or termination of parental rights.' Jurisdictions
usually adopt statutes that both define "neglect" and establish broad
1. The "best interests of the child" test achieved prominence in child custody cases
after the landmark decision of Judge Brewer in Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881). The
test is now used in child custody cases between two parents or between parent and
nonparent and in child neglect cases. Although an imprecise test, courts have delineated
boundaries of concern which require the judge "recognizing human frailty and man's limitations with respect to forecasting the future course of human events, to make an informed
and rational judgment, free of bias and favor, as to the least detrimental of the available
alternatives." In re J.S.R., 374 A.2d 860, 863 (D.C. 1977). Factors considered by the court
depend on the nature of the action and vary from mistreatment of children, Wood v. State,
248 Ark. 109, 450 S.W.2d 537 (1970), to mental deficiency of the parents, In re Bachelor, 211
Kan. 879, 508 P.2d 862 (1973).
2. 43 C.J.S. Infants § 61 (1978). Some jurisdictions, however, had determined prior to
Santosky that permanent deprivation of parental rights must be supported by a stricter standard of evidence such as "substantial evidence," Sernaker v. Ehrlich, 86 Nev. 277, 468 P.2d
5 (1970); "clear and convincing," In re Lehmann, 37 Iil. App. 3d 217, 345 N.E.2d 742 (1976),
In re Nelson, 216 Kan. 271, 531 P.2d 48 (1975); or "akin to proof beyond a reasonable
doubt," In re Pitts, 535 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1975).
3. Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982). The Court in Santosky held that the
"clear and convincing" standard of proof was constitutionally required, under the due process test of Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), in New York's "permanent
neglect" proceedings where parental rights to children are permanently terminated. The
Court emphasized throughout the opinion the severity of termination of parental rights and
the corresponding need for a higher standard of proof.
4. New York employs a two-tier system, differentiating between a child who is adjudged "neglected" and one who is adjudged "permanently neglected." Parental rights can only
be terminated once a child is adjudged "permanently neglected."
Section 371(4)(a) of the Social Services Law of New York, defines a "neglected" child as
one under eighteen years of age
(i) whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his parent or other
person legally responsible for his care to exercise a minimum degree of care
(A) in supplying the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, education, medi-
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guidelines for the courts to follow in making these determinations. Factors
considered include the current and continuing unfitness of the parent,
physical abuse, and the failure of the parent to provide an adequate home
for the child.5
The District of Columbia has the authority to remove neglected children
from the custody of their parents under D.C. Code sections 16-2301
through 16-2320. Section 16-2317 establishes the requirements for neglect
hearings and uses the preponderance of the evidence standard as the standard of proof necessary to determine that a child is neglected.6 Under the
District of Columbia statute, if a child is determined to be neglected, the
court has a number of dispositional options. It may allow retention of cuscal or surgical care, though financially able to do so or offered financial or other
reasonable means to do so; or
(B) in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or a substantial risk thereof, including the infliction of excessive corporal punishment; or by misusing a drug or drugs;
or by misusing alcoholic beverages to the extent that he loses self-control of his
actions; or by any other acts of a similarly serious nature requiring the aid of the
court ...

or,

(ii) who has been abandoned by his parents or other person legally responsible for
his care.
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 371 4(a) (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1981).
"Permanent neglect" is a more serious determination which requires findings beyond ordinary "neglect" and establishes additional criteria. As defined in New York's Social Services Law § 384-b(7)(a), a "permanently neglected" child
shall mean a child who is in the care of an authorized agency and whose parent or
custodian has failed for a period of more than one year following the date such
child came into the care of an authorized agency substantially and continuously or
repeatedly to maintain contact with or plan for the future of the child, although
physically and financially able to do so, notwithstanding the agency's diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship when such efforts will
not be detrimental to the best interests of the child. In the event that the parent
defaults after due notice of a proceeding to determine such neglect, such physical
and financial ability of such parent may be presumed by the court.
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1981)
This two-tier approach is similar to the District of Columbia model. Section 16-2301 of
the D.C. Code defines a "neglected" child in terms substantially similar to New York § 371,
4(a). Similarly, under District of Columbia law, parental rights can only be terminated after
further proceedings pursuant to §§ 16-2351 to 16-2365. Section 16-2354 stipulates that a motion can only be filed to terminate parental rights after a child has been adjudged neglected
for at least six months and is in the custody of an authorized agency or person other than his
or her parent, or, if the child is abandoned and the parent has not been located within three
months prior to the termination proceeding. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2301, 16-2351 to 162365, 16-2354 (1981).
Thus, under Santosky, only the standard of evidence employed in the second-tier termination proceedings under both New York and District of Columbia laws is elevated to clear
and convincing.
5. See 43 C.J.S. Infants § 61, at 250-51.
6. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2317(c) (1981) provides in pertinent part:
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tody with the parents, placement of the child under protective services or
with a public agency, transfer of legal custody to a relative or individual
other than the parent, commitment to an institution for mental, physical or
other treatment, transfer of the child to a placement agency, or termination
of parental rights to enable adoption. Termination suits may only be undertaken pursuant to sections 16-2351 through 16-2365, which require
findings beyond ordinary neglect and establish more stringent criteria to
justify termination of parental rights. 7 Except for permanent termination
of custody to enable adoption,8 the dispositional order which vests legal
custody of a neglected child in an agency, institution, department, or individual other than the parent, is effective for a maximum of two years.
Within the two year period, the court may terminate the temporary placement. A protective services disposition expires after one year. 9
In In re B.K., decided in 198 1,1° the father of a child adjudged neglected
and placed in the temporary custody of her maternal grandparents, challenged both the finding and the constitutionality of the District of Columbia's neglect statute. The appellant's argument that the statutory definition
of neglect was unconstitutionally vague was summarily dismissed by the
court. The court stated that although broad, the statute was not vague and
that proceedings of this kind necessarily had to be flexible and decided on
a case by case basis. I
The appellant also challenged the standard of proof employed in section
(c) If the Division finds in a fact-finding hearing that (2) the allegations in a need of supervision or neglect petition have been established by the preponderance of the evidence, the Division, after giving the notice
required by subsection (e) of this section, shall proceed to hold a dispositional
hearing.
7. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2320 (1981).
8. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2351 to 16-2365 (1981). These sections, constituting a recently adopted subchapter III, set out criteria which are far more stringent than ordinary
neglect standards in order to justify the drastic action of permanently terminating parental

rights.

9. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2322 (1981).
10. In re B.K., 429 A.2d 1331 (D.C. 1981).
11. Id at 1334. The court did recognize that it had to tread carefully in the area of
family relations, quoting from In re J.S.R., that:
The right of a natural parent to raise one's child is a fundamental and essential one
which is constitutionally protected. However, it is not an absolute one. The state
has both the right and the duty to protect minor children through judicial determinations of their interest. To this end, the state has a substantial range of authority
to protect the welfare of a child, and the state's legitimate interest in the child's
welfare may be implemented by separating the child from the parent. 374 A.2d
860, 863 (D.C. 1977) (citations omitted).
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16-2317(c)(2) for a finding of neglect,12 contending that a standard of
"clear and convincing" is constitutionally required in neglect determinations because of the threat to the sanctity of the family. 13 The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the preponderance of the evidence standard. It stated that the interests involved in the
temporary removal of a child from a parent's custody in most neglect proceedings are much less compelling than those involved in a permanent termination proceeding which results in adoption. However, even in the latter
proceeding, a "clear and convincing" standard of proof was not constitutionally required at the time of the decision. 4 The appellate court reasoned that since the "clear and convincing" standard was not
constitutionally required in an adoption case where the consequences are
much more severe than those involved in a temporary transfer of parental
rights, it followed that the "clear and convincing" standard was not constitutionally required in the latter neglect proceeding.
Although the court's analogy to the standard of proof for adoption cases
is no longer accurate under the recent Santosky decision, the standard of
"preponderance of the evidence" employed in ordinary neglect cases remains constitutionally valid. The United States Supreme Court in
Santosky stressed that the higher "clear and convincing" evidence standard was necessary in suits to terminate parental rights, a result that can12. See supra note 4.
13. In re B.K., 429 A.2d at 1333. See supra note 4.
14. 429 A.2d at 1333. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2351 to 16-2365 (1981). The court
cited In re J.S.R., 374 A.2d 860 (D.C. 1977), in support of its conclusion. There, the Superior
Court had granted a petition for adoption of a minor child over the objections of his natural
mother, the appellant. The appellant had tried without success to arrange to have the child
adopted before his birth. After giving birth, the appellant was found to have multiple sclerosis and was unable to care for the child. The child remained at the hospital and was subsequently put in a series of foster homes. When the child's foster parents petitioned to adopt
the child, however, the appellant objected. The trial court found that the appellant's consent
to the adoption was withheld against the best interests of the child and granted the adoption
petition as the "least detrimental alternative."
The appellant challenged the decision, asserting that: (1) the "best interests of the child"
test was unconstitutionally vague; (2) that approval of adoption over her objection without a
finding that she was unfit violated constitutional mandates; and (3) that a clear and convincing standard of proof was constitutionally required to determine if parental consent was
being withheld contrary to the child's best interests. The appellate court upheld the lower
court decision, holding that, though warranted in this case, the clear and convincing standard was not constitutionally required in adoption proceedings.
Thus, although the result in In re J.S.R. remains valid, Santosky reduces to incorrect dicta
the appellate court's determination that a "clear and convincing" standard is not constitutionally required in adoption cases involving the termination of parental rights.
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not occur in ordinary neglect actions under D.C. Code section 16-2317."5
Martha Brooks van der Veen

15. See supra note 4.

